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Abstract. In this paper, we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in [3], [6], [8], [9]; 
already employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) and some new algorithms, using the software wxMaxima 11.04.0, 
in order to reach a total scenario knowledge (that is the total knowledge of the payoff space of the interaction) 
of the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), viewed as a complex interaction between two competitive subjects, in a 
particularly interesting asymmetric case. Moreover, in this work we propose a theoretical justification, for a general 
kind of asymmetric duopolistic interactions (which often appear in the real economic world), by considering and 
proposing a Cobb-Douglas perturbation of the classic linear model of production costs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Cournot Duopoly is a classic oligopolistic market in which there are two enterprises producing the 
same commodity and selling it in the same market. In this classic model, in a competitive background, 
the two enterprises employ as possible strategies the quantities of the commodity produced. The main 
solutions proposed in literature for this kind of duopoly are the Nash equilibrium and the Collusive 
Optimum, without any subsequent critical exam about these two kinds of solutions. The absence of any 
critical quantitative analysis is due to the relevant lack of knowledge regarding the set of all possible 
outcomes of this strategic interaction. On the contrary, by considering the Cournot Duopoly as a 
differentiable game (normal form games with differentiable payoff functions) and studying it by the 
topological methodologies introduced in Game Theory by D. Carfì, we obtain an exhaustive and 
complete vision of the entire payoff space of the Cournot game (this also in asymmetric cases with the 
help of wxMaxima) and this total view allows us to analyze critically the classic solutions and to find 
other ways of action to select Pareto strategies, in the asymmetric cases too. In order to illustrate the 
applications of this topological methodologies to the considered infinite game, several compromise 
decisions are considered, and we show how the complete study gives a real extremely extended 
comprehension of the classic model. 
 
 
2. Formal description of a generalized Cournot normal form game 
 
Our model of Cournot game is a non-linear two-players loss game G = (f, >) (see also [6], [8] and [9]). 
The two players/enterprises are called Emil and Frances (following J.P. Aubin’s books [1] and [2]). 
 
Assumption 1 (strategy sets). The two players produce and offer the same commodity in the 
quantities x ∊ ℝ≥ for Emil and y ∊ ℝ≥ for Frances. In more precise terms: the payoff function f of the game 
G is defined on a subset of the positive cone of the Cartesian plane ℝ2, interpreted as a space of bi-
quantities. We assume (by simplicity) that the set of all strategies, of each player, is the interval E = [0, +∞[. 
 
Assumption 2 (asymmetry of the game). The game G is not assumed necessarily symmetric with 
respect to the players. In other terms, the payoff pair f(x, y) is not assumed to be the symmetric of the pair 
f(y, x). 
 
Assumption 3 (form of price function). We suppose the price function, p from ℝ2 into ℝ, linear 
and defined by 
 
p(x, y) = a – b1x – b2 y (2. 1) 
 
for every productive bi-strategy (x, y), where a ≥ 0 is a fixed price and bi > 0 (i = 1,2) is the marginal 
coefficient corresponding to the production of the player i. 
 
Assumption 4 (form of cost functions). Let the cost function C1 (defined on E2) of the first player 
be given by 
 
C1(x, y) = c1 x + e1xy + d, (2. 2) 
 
for every positive price pair (x, y) and let, analogously, the demand function of the second enterprise be 
given by 
 
C2(x, y) = c2 y + e2 xy + d, (2. 3) 
 
for every positive bi-strategy (x, y), with c > 0 the marginal cost and d ≥ 0 the fixed cost. So we are 
considering a Cobb-Douglas perturbation of the classic linear costs. 
 
Assumption 5 (payoff functions). First player’s net  co s t  func t ion  is defined, classically, by the 
revenue 
 
ƒ1(x, y) = C1(x, y) - p(x, y)x = 
            = c1 x + e1xy + d – (ax – b1xx – b2 xy) = 
            = x(b1x + (b2 + e1)y – (a – c1)) + d = 
            = x(b1x + (b2 + e1)y  – w1) + d = 
            = w1 x((b1/ w1)x + ((b2 + e1)/ w1)y  – 1) + d, (2. 4) 
 
for every positive bi-strategy (x, y). Symmetrically, for Frances, the profit function is defined by 
 
ƒ2(x, y) = C2(x, y) - p(x, y)y = 
            = y((b1 + e2)x + b2y – (a – c2)) + d = 
            = y((b1 + e2)x + b2y – w2) + d = 
            = w2y((b1 + e2)/w2)x + (b2/w2)y – 1) + d , (2. 5) 
 
for every positive bistrategy (x, y). 
 
 
3. Study of the Cournot’s normal form game 
 
In the following we shall study the following particular case. We shall put: 
 
w2 = w1 = 1 ;  b1 = 2 ; e2 = -1 ; b2 = 1; e1 = 0, 
 
so that, the bi-loss function is defined by 
 
ƒ(x, y) = (x(2x + y - 1), y(x + y - 1)) + (d, d), 
 
for every bistrategy (x, y) of the game in the unbounded square E2. 
 
Payoff vector function. When the fixed cost d is zero (this assumption determines only a “reversible” 
translation of the loss space), the bi-loss function ƒ from the compact square [0, 1]2 into the bi-loss plane ℝ2  
is defined by 
 
ƒ(x, y) = (x(2x + y - 1), y(x + y - 1)), (3. 1) 
 
for every bistrategy (x, y) in the square S = [0, 1]2 which is the convex envelope of its vertices, denoted by A, 
B, C, D starting from the origin and going anticlockwise. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.1 The graphical representation of the Cournot payoff function f 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.2 The graphical representation of the Cournot payoff function f 
 
 
Figure 0.3 The graphical representation of the Cournot payoff function f 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.4 The graphical representation of the Cournot payoff function f 
 
Critical space of the game. Now, we must find the  c r i t i ca l  space  o f  the  game  and its image by the 
function ƒ, before representing ƒ(S). For, we determine (as explained in [3], [6], [8] and [9]) firstly the 
Jacobian matrix of the function ƒ at any point (x, y) - denoted by Jƒ(x, y). We will have, in vector form, the pair 
of gradients 
 
Jƒ(x, y) = ((y + 4x - 1, x), (y, 2y + x - 1)), (3. 2) 
 
and concerning the determinant of the above pair of vectors 
 
det Jƒ(x, y) = (y + 4x - 1)(2y + x - 1) – xy = 2y2 + 8xy – 3y + 4x2 – 5x + 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 0.5 The graphical representation of the Jacobian determinant of payoff function f 
 
 
 
Figure 0.6 The graphical representation of the Jacobian determinant of payoff function f 
 
The Jacobian determinant is zero at those points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) of the strategy square such that 
 
y1 = -sqrt(32 x12 – 8 x1 + 1)/4 – 2 x1 + 3/4   or  y2 = sqrt(32 x22 – 8x2 + 1)/4 – 2 x2 + 3/4. 
 
We obtain two curves (Figure 3.1) whose union is the critical zone of Cournot Game. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Critical zone of Cournot game 
4. Transformation of the strategy space 
 
It is readily seen that the intersection points of the green curve with the boundary of the strategic 
square are the point K = (2/8, 0). 
 
Remark.  The point K is the intersection point of the green curve with the segment [A, B], its 
abscissa µ verifies the non-negative condition and the following equation 
 
sqrt(32µ12 – 8µ1 + 2) = 3 - 8µ1, (4. 1) 
 
this abscissa is so µ1 = 2/8 (equal to 0,25). 
 
We start from Figure 3.1. The transformations of the bi-strategy square vertices and of the points H, 
K are the following: 
 
• A' = ƒ(A) = ƒ(0, 0) = (0, 0); 
• B' = ƒ(B) = ƒ(1, 0) = (1, 0); 
• C' = ƒ(C) = ƒ(1, 1) = (2, 1); 
• D' = ƒ(D) = ƒ(0, 1) = (0, 0); 
• H' = ƒ(H) = ƒ(0, 1/2) = (0, -1/4); 
• K' = ƒ(K) = ƒ(2/8, 0) = (-1/8, 0). 
 
Starting from Figure 3.1, with S = [0, 1]2, we can do the transformation of its sides. 
 
Side [A, B]. Its parameterization is the function sending any point x ∊ [0, 1] into the point (x, 0); the 
transformation of this side can be obtained by transformation of its generic point (x, 0), we have 
 
ƒ(x, 0) = (2x2 - x, 0). (4. 2) 
 
We obtain the segment with end points K' and B', with parametric equations 
 
X = 2x2 - x and Y = 0, (4. 3) 
 
with x in the unit interval. 
 
Side [B, C]. Its parameterization is  
 
(x = 1, y ∊ [0, 1]); 
 
the figure of the generic point is 
 
ƒ(1, y) = (y + 1, y2). (4. 4) 
 
We can obtain the parabola passing through the points B', C' with parametric equations 
 
X = y + 1 and Y = y2. (4. 5) 
 
Side [C, D]. Its parameterization is 
 
(x ∊ [0, 1], y = 1); 
 
the transformation of its generic point is 
 
ƒ(x, 1) = (2x2, x). (4. 6) 
 
We obtain the parabola passing through the points D', C' with parametric equations 
 
X = 2x2 and Y = x, (4. 7) 
 
with x in the unit interval. 
 
Side [A, D]. Its parameterization is 
 
(x = 0, y ∊ [0, 1]); 
 
the transformation of its generic point is 
ƒ(0, y) = (0, y2 - y). (4. 8) 
 
We obtain the segment with end points A' and H', with parametric equations 
 
X = 0 and Y = y2 - y. (4. 9) 
 
Now, we find the  t rans format ion  o f  the  c r i t i ca l  zone . The parameterization of the critical zone is 
defined by the equations 
 
y1 = -sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 – 2x + 3/4, (see (3. 5)) 
 
and 
 
y2 = sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 – 2x + 3/4. (see (3. 6)) 
 
The parametrization of the GREEN ZONE is 
 
(x ∊ [0, 1], y = y1); 
 
the transformation of its generic point is 
 
ƒ(x, y1) = (x(2x + y1 - 1), y1(x + y1 - 1)), (4. 10) 
 
a parametrization of the YELLOW ZONE is (x ∊ [0, 1], y = y2); the transformation of its generic point is 
 
ƒ(x, y2) = (x(2x + y2 - 1), y2(x + y2 - 1)). (4. 11) 
 
The transformation of the Green Zone has parametric equations 
 
X = x(-sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 - 1/4)  (4.12) 
 
and 
 
Y = (-sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 – 2x + 3/4)(-sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 - x - 1/4), (4. 13) 
 
and the transformation of the Yellow Zone has parametric equations 
 
X = x(sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 - 1/4) (4. 14)  
 
and 
 
Y = (sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 – 2x + 3/4)(sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 - x - 1/4). (4. 15) 
 
We have two colored curves in green and black (Figure 4.1). The black curve is break by a point of 
discontinuity T obtained by resolving the following equation 
 
x(sqrt(32x2 – 8x + 1)/4 - 1/4) = 0; (4. 16) 
 
the solutions of the above equation are 
 
x1 = 1/4, x2 = 0, (4. 17) 
 
and, replacing them in the parametrical equations of the critical zone (4.15) we obtain T1 = 0 and T2 = - 1/8 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1. Payoff space of Cournot game 
5. Non-cooperative friendly phase 
 
Examining the Figure 4.1 we note that the game has two extremes: the shadow minimum α = (-1/8, -1/4) 
and the maximum β = Cˈ= (2, 1). The Pareto minimal boundary of the payoff space ƒ(S) is the curve passing 
through the points K' and H' colored in green showed in the Figure 5.1. The Pareto maximal boundary of the 
payoff space ƒ(S) coincides with the maximum β = C'= (2, 1). Both Emil and Frances do not control the Pareto 
minimal boundary; they could reach the point K' and H' of the boundary, but the solution is not many 
satisfactory for them. In fact, a player will suffer the maximum loss. 
 
 
Figure 5. 1. Extrema of the Asymmetric Cournot game 
	  
 
 
Figure 5. 2. Extrema of the Symmetric Cournot game 
 
Remark. Comparing the figure 5.1 with the figure 5.2 we may observe that the benefit to the 
community in case of asymmetry decreases; in fact the area contained in the first quadrant is greater than the 
symmetric case and the area contained in the third quadrant is smaller than the symmetric one. In other 
terms, when the Cournot duopoly becomes an asymmetric games is easier to have a loss. 
 
 
6. Properly non-cooperative (egoistic) phase 
 
Now, we will consider the  bes t  r ep ly  corr e spondences  between the two players Emil and Frances. If 
Frances produces the quantity y of the commodity, Emil, in order to reply rationally, should minimize his 
partial cost function 
 
ƒ1(·, y) : x ↦ x(2x + y - 1), (6. 1) 
 
on the compact interval [0, 1]. According to the Weierstrass theorem, there is at least one Emil’s strategy 
minimizing that partial cost function and, by Fermàt theorem, the Emil ’ s  bes t  r ep ly  s t ra t egy  to  Frances ’  
s t ra t egy  y is the only quantity 
 
B1(y) = x* := 1/4(1 - y). (6. 2) 
 
Indeed, the partial derivative 
 
ƒ1(·, y)'(x) = 4x + y - 1, (6. 3) 
 
is negative for x < x* and positive for x > x*. So, the Emil’s best reply correspondence is the function B1 
from the interval [0, 1] into the interval [0, 1], defined by y ↦ 1/4(1 - y). If Emil produces the quantity x of 
the commodity, Frances, in order to reply rationally, should minimize his partial cost function 
 
ƒ2(x, ·) : y ↦ y(x + y - 1), (6. 4) 
 
on the compact interval [0, 1]. According to the Weierstrass theorem, there is at least one Frances’ strategy 
minimizing that partial cost function and, by Fermàt theorem, the Frances ’  bes t  r ep ly  s t ra t egy  to  Emil ’ s  
s t ra t egy  x is the only quantity 
 
B2(x) = y* := 1/2(1 - x). (6. 5) 
 
Indeed, the partial derivative 
 
ƒ2(x, ·)'(y) = 2y + x - 1, 
 
is negative for x < x* and positive for x > x*. So, the Frances’ best reply correspondence is the function B2 
from the interval [0, 1] into the interval [0, 1], defined by x ↦ 1/2(1 - x). The Nash equilibrium is the fixed 
point of the multifunction B - associated with the pair of two reaction functions (B2, B1) - defined from the 
Cartesian product of the domains into the Cartesian product of the codomains (in inverse order), by B : (x, y) ↦ (B1(y), B2(x)), that is the only bi-strategy (x, y) such that 
 
x = 1/4(1 - y)  and  y = 1/2(1 - x), (6. 6) 
 
that is the point N = (1/7, 3/7) - as we can see also from Fig. 6.1 - which gives a bi-loss N' = (-2/49, -9/49), as 
Figures 6.2 will show. The Nash equilibrium is not completely satisfactory, because it is not a Pareto optimal 
bi-strategy, but it represents the only properly non-cooperative game solution. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 1. Nash Equilibrium of Cournot game 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 2. Payoff at Nash equilibrium of Cournot game 
	  
	  
7. Defensive and offensive phase 
 
Players’ conservative values are obtained through their wors t  lo s s  func t ions . 
 
Worst loss functions. On the square S = [0, 1]2, Emil ’ s  wors t  lo s s  func t ion  is defined by 
 
ƒ#1(x) = supy ∊ F x(2x + y - 1) = 2x2, (7. 1) 
 
its minimum will be 
 
v#1 = infx ∊ E (ƒ#1(x)) = infx ∊ E (2x2) = 0, (7. 2) 
 
attained at the conservative strategy x# = 0. 
 
Frances ’  wors t  lo s s  func t ion  is defined by 
 
ƒ#2(y) = supx ∊ E y(x + y - 1) = y2, (7. 3) 
 
its minimum will be  
 
v#2 = infy ∊ F (ƒ#2(y)) = infy ∊ F (y2) = 0 (7. 4) 
 
attained at the unique conservative strategy y# = 0. 
 
Conservative bivalue. The conservative bivalue is 
 
v# = (v#1, v#2) = (0, 0). 
 
The wors t  o f f ens iv e  mul t i func t ions  are determined by the study of the worst loss functions. 
 
The Frances’ worst offensive reaction multifunction !2 is defined by !2(x) = 1, for every Emil’s strategy x; 
indeed, fixed an Emil’s strategy x the Frances’ strategy 1 maximizes the partial cost function ƒ1(x, .). The 
Emil’s worst offensive correspondence versus Frances is defined by !1(y) = 1, for every Frances’ strategy y. 
 
The dominant  o f f ens iv e  s t ra t egy  is 1 for both players, indeed the offensive correspondences are 
constant.  
 
The cor e  o f  the  payo f f  space  (in the sense introduced by J.P. Aubin) is the Pareto minimal 
boundary, contained in the cone of lower bounds of the conservative bi-value v#; the conservative bi-value 
don’t give us a bound for the choice of cooperative bistrategies. 
 
The conserva t iv e  knot  of the game is the point (0, 0). 
 
 
8. Cooperative phase  
 
When there is an agreement between the two players, the  bes t  compromise  so lu t ion  ( in  the  s ense  
in troduced  by  J .P .  Aubin)  showed graphically in the Figures 8.1. 
 
Besides, the best compromise solution coincides with the core best compromise, with the Nash bargaining 
solution, with the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. It coincides also with the  t rans f e rab l e  u t i l i t y  so lu t ion  
which is the unique Pareto strategy that minimized the aggregate utility function f1 + f2, this can be easily 
viewed by geometric evidences considering on the payoff universe the levels of that aggregate function, 
which are affine lines parallel to the vector (1,-1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 1. Conservative study. The core and the Kalai-Smorodinsky payoff of Cournot game 
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